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Abstract
In this article, a framework of privacy-preserving inpainting for outsourced image and an encrypted-image inpainting
scheme are proposed. Different with conventional image inpainting in plaintext domain, there are two entities, that is,
content owner and image restorer, in our framework. Content owner first encrypts his or her damaged image for pri-
vacy protection and outsources the encrypted, damaged image to image restorer, who may be a cloud server with pow-
erful computation capability. Image restorer performs inpainting in encrypted domain and sends the inpainted and
encrypted image back to content owner or authorized receiver, who can acquire final inpainted result in plaintext
domain through decryption. In our encrypted-image inpainting scheme, with the assist of Johnson–Lindenstrauss trans-
form that can preserve Euclidean distance between two vectors before and after encryption, the best-matching block
with the smallest distance to current block can be found and utilized for patch filling in Paillier-encrypted image. To elimi-
nate mosaic effect after decryption, weighted mean filtering in encrypted domain is conducted with Paillier homo-
morphic properties. Experimental results show that our privacy-preserving inpainting framework can be effectively
applied in secure cloud computing, and the proposed encrypted-image inpainting scheme achieves comparable visual
quality of inpainted results with some typical inpainting schemes in plaintext domain.
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Introduction
Image inpainting is also known as image retouching,
the idea of which is inherited from ancient technique of
manually repairing valuable artworks in an indiscern-
ible way.1 Inpainting of digital images has found appli-
cations in such fields as repairing of historical
photographs,2 filling in or removing the selected region
in images,3 and wiping off visible watermarks.4 In
recent years, some studies have also been investigated
to utilize image inpainting technique in deinterlacing,5
image compression,6,7 image self-recovery,8,9 data hid-
ing,10 and repairing missing blocks of JPEG images
due to poor channels.11 As for traditional image
restoration, the regions for restoring generally include
both noise and useful information. However, the
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damaged or missing regions to be inpainted often con-
tain no useful information. Hence, the task of inpaint-
ing is to produce or create image regions that initially
do not exist at all, according to the available informa-
tion in close neighborhood and some mathematical
models. Currently, there are four main categories of
image inpainting methods, including interpolation-
based methods,12–15 partial differential equation
(PDE)-based methods,1,2,16–18 exemplar/patch-based
methods,3,19–21 and learning-based methods.22–25 A
brief review of these inpainting methods is given in sec-
tion ‘‘Related works.’’
Nowadays, with the prosperous development of
Internet and mobile network, cloud storage and com-
puting have become more and more prevalent. Due to
the limit storage space and computation capability, the
users can upload their multimedia data (such as texts,
images, audios, and videos) through network, and vari-
ous kinds of data computing required by users can be
outsourced and implemented by cloud server. However,
although cloud computing brings promising conve-
niences, the security issue is also raised at the same time
because of the user privacy problem.26 In other words,
users are afraid that their private data will be leaked, or
cloud server and the third party may abuse their data.
Therefore, a secure and reasonable solution is to
encrypt the user data before outsourcing to the cloud
for privacy protection, and the cloud server can per-
form data computing in the encrypted domain. Then,
after conducting decryption for the received data from
cloud server, the user can obtain the processed data
with desirable effects in the plaintext domain. Based on
this application scenario and requirements, in recent
years, the studies of secure signal processing in
encrypted domain have been widely investigated, such
as transform,27 compression,28 denoising,29 feature
extraction,30 and data hiding31,32 for encrypted data.
In this article, we mainly focus on the problem of
privacy-preserving inpainting for outsourced images.
The aim of this problem is to realize the inpainting for
encrypted, damaged images of users on the cloud server
without sacrificing user privacy. Currently, although
many image processing tools have modules to inpaint
images, there are still a lot of manual operations that
should be involved. In addition, these tools are often
not free, and if we just have only a few images required
to be inpainted, it is actually not a cost-effective choice
to pay for these software. However, if we need to con-
duct inpainting for a large number of images, these pro-
fessional tools often involve many manual operations
and complex calculations during the implementation
on the user client with limited computation capability
and power. If we decide to outsource the inpainting
work to the cloud, the privacy of image owner must be
considered, which means the images to be inpainted
should be encrypted at first. However, after the images
are encrypted to prevent information leakage, there are
also few related information that can be utilized in the
encrypted domain for inpainting. Hence, the challen-
ging and innovative task of outsourcing encrypted,
damaged images to the cloud for automatic inpainting
without leaking privacy deserves our in-depth investiga-
tions and has a lot of application scenarios. To the best
of our knowledge, the reported works of inpainting all
focused on the plaintext domain, and there have been
no published literatures about image inpainting in the
encrypted domain.
In this work, we propose a damaged image inpaint-
ing scheme based on a new privacy-preserving inpaint-
ing framework. The main contributions of the
proposed scheme are summarized as follows: (1) The
operation of image inpainting in our scheme is com-
pletely implemented in the encrypted domain, and
image restorer cannot access any information of
plaintext-image contents; (2) To calculate priority order
and find similar blocks in encrypted image, with the
assist of Johnson–Lindenstrauss (JL) transform that
preserves Euclidean distance between two vectors
before and after encryption, the best-matching, intact
block can be found in the source region, and the intact
patch is exploited to fill the damaged patch in homo-
morphic encrypted image; (3) To eliminate the undesir-
able mosaic effect after decryption, the weighted mean
filtering in the encrypted domain is performed using
the properties homomorphic cryptosystem; (4) Besides
protecting the privacy of image owner, the proposed
encrypted-image inpainting scheme can achieve compa-
rable performance of inpainted-image quality with
respect to some typical inpainting schemes for plaintext
images.
The rest parts of the article are organized as follows.
Section ‘‘Related works’’ presents brief reviews of
image inpainting and homomorphic encryption.
Section ‘‘Proposed scheme’’ describes the detailed pro-
cedures of the proposed privacy-preserving inpainting
scheme for outsourced image, including image encryp-
tion, inpainting for encrypted image, and image decryp-
tion. Experimental results and analysis are presented in
section ‘‘Experimental results and analysis.’’ Section
‘‘Conclusion’’ concludes the article.
Related works
Image inpainting
Generally speaking, current image inpainting methods
can be categorized as non-learning-based methods and
learning-based methods. Learning-based inpainting
methods22–25 often require a large-scale set of intact
images for training with a specific deep neural network
and then learn how to generate a reasonable repaired
result for damaged region in a given image. Non-
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learning-based inpainting methods depend on the char-
acteristic of autocorrelation within natural image,
which usually exploit intact information only in current
given image beyond its damaged region and use the
exploited intact information to repair damaged region
seamlessly in different ways, such as interpolation,12–15
PDE propagation,1,2,16–18 and patch synthesis.3,19–21
Interpolation-based methods. Shih et al.12 proposed a
multi-resolution method using pixel interpolation. In
their method, the damaged image for inpainting was
segmented into blocks, and the segmentation was con-
ducted until the variances of sub-blocks were smaller
than a pre-determined threshold. Damaged pixel was
then repaired through the mean value of current sub-
block or sub-block of previous level. Another image
inpainting scheme with interpolation strategy was pro-
posed in Shih et al.,13 which evaluated neighboring
information of each pixel to be inpainted and decided
the size of reference window that can be exploited to
calculate an interpolated color. However, these meth-
ods may lead to blurring effects when damaged pixels
were close to image edges.
PDE-based methods. This type of methods was moti-
vated by intensive works on the use of variational and
PDE methods in image processing. Bertalmio et al.2
established an inpainting mathematical model by bor-
rowing ideas from classic fluid dynamics. By iteratively
solving the numerical representation of a PDE, intact
information of neighboring areas can be smoothly pro-
pagated into damaged region along isophote direction.
Guided by the connectivity principle of human visual
perception, Chan and Shen16 proposed a non-texture
image inpainting method with a third-order PDE,
which essentially was an anisotropic diffusion process
based on the total variation (TV) model.17 To meet the
requirements of human vision, diffusion intensity was
related to the curvature. Even if the remaining objects
were disconnected far apart by damaged region, this
method can still output acceptable inpainted result.
However, the PDE-based methods cannot deal with the
large-area inpainting very well and often introduced
heavy computation complexity due to high-order
mathematic models.
Exemplar/patch-based methods. This type of methods
employed the strategy of texture synthesis33 to repair
larger damaged region. Criminisi et al.20 presented an
exemplar-based image inpainting method, which can be
used for both region filling and object removal. This
method implemented the task of patch synthesis
through a best-first filling mechanism, and the value of
priority for each patch depended on the percentage of
intact pixels and the angle between the isophote and
contour normal on the center pixel. After locating the
patch with the maximum priority in damaged region,
the most similar patch was selected for substitution
from the intact region in the image, and then the prior-
ity values should be updated to continue above process
repeatedly. Inpainting procedure was terminated till all
damaged patches were repaired. This method can
achieve better inpainted results for larger damaged
region than the PDE-based methods, although it may
leave some artificial seams between the patches.
Learning-based methods. In recent years, a lot of works
have applied the convolutional neural network (CNN)
to image inpainting, such as Iizuka et al.22 and Pathak
et al.25 In these tasks, training samples were utilized to
train the deep CNN so that they can estimate the pixel
strength of the damaged region in the input image.24
Benefiting from large-scale training data, these
learning-based methods can produce semantic specious
inpainting results. However, the existing CNN-based
inpainting methods usually completed damaged region
by propagating convolution feature to the fully con-
nected layer, which sometimes made the inpainted
results lack fine texture details with blurring. Another
powerful family of learning-based inpainting methods
with deep generative model23 has also been proposed
through introducing the adversarial loss to improve the
visual quality of the inpainted results. Generally speak-
ing, learning-based methods can achieve superior glo-
bal semantic structures of inpainted results compared
with non-learning-based methods, while non-learning-
based methods can obtain fine local textures of
inpainted results with much less computational
complexity.
In this work, we mainly focus on the non-learning-
based image inpainting methods, which have efficient
and clear algorithms to follow and are more possible to
be implemented in the encrypted domain with privacy-
preserving capability than the learning-based methods.
Homomorphic encryption
To achieve computing in the encrypted domain, appro-
priate encryption methods should be first addressed.
Homomorphic encryption generally includes partially
homomorphic encryption (PHE), fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE), and somewhat homomorphic
encryption (SHE). PHE allows either addition or multi-
plication operations. Rivest et al.34 proposed a homo-
morphic encryption algorithm, which can maintain
some algebraic relationships between the plaintext and
the ciphertext. These relationships can be exploited to
realize the computation for encrypted data effectively.
Afterward, several probabilistic public-key
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cryptosystems were presented, such as ElGamal35 cryp-
tosystem, Paillier36 cryptosystem, and Damgård and
Jurik37 cryptosystem, and these cryptographic algo-
rithms only had one homomorphic property, that is,
addition or multiplication. For example, Paillier cryp-
tosystem only had the addition homomorphism, which
means that the addition of two plaintexts can be
achieved through performing some operations on the
two corresponding ciphertexts. FHE allows arbitrary
number of addition and multiplication operations.38 In
other words, FHE can realize the homomorphisms of
addition and multiplication simultaneously, and theo-
retically speaking, it can solve any privacy-preserving
computation problems. SHE allows addition and mul-
tiplication operations, but the number of operations is
limited.39
Proposed scheme
In this section, we first present a new privacy-preserving
inpainting framework for outsourced image, which can
be effectively applied in the environment of cloud com-
puting. Generally speaking, there are two entities in our
framework, that is, content owner and image restorer,
see Figure 1. Content owner, who has no professional
inpainting capability, wants to have his or her damaged
image repaired without disclosing image contents for
privacy preserving. Hence, the ideal framework for this
application scenario is that the content owner first
encrypts the damaged image for inpainting and out-
sources the encrypted image to the image restorer, who
may be a cloud server with powerful computation capa-
bility. Then, the restorer can conduct the inpainting
operation for the damaged image effectively in the
encrypted domain and sends the inpainted, encrypted
image back to the content owner or the legal receiver,
who can directly obtain the inpainted result in plaintext
domain through image decryption.
To achieve the above described functions in the
framework, a specific encrypted-image inpainting
scheme is also proposed. Content owner first chooses a
target region V to be removed or filled in the damaged
image Id and labels the position of the target region
through a binary mask image Q, in which the pixels
with the values of 0 and 1 denote intact area and dam-
aged area at the corresponding coordinates in the dam-
aged image Id, respectively. Then, the damaged image
Id is encrypted by Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem
and JL transform to produce two encrypted results,
that is, EP and EJ. The content owner sends EP, EJ, and
Q to image restorer for inpainting through the public
channel. After receiving EP, EJ, and Q, the image
restorer can perform image inpainting in the encrypted
domain by utilizing these three components. In detail,
the priority is first calculated for each pixel belonging
to the target region according to the mask image Q.
With the assist of EJ, the encrypted, damaged image EP
can be inpainted as EP# through the mechanism of sam-
ple patch filling in the priority order. Then, the target
region of EP# is further smoothed with the weighted
mean filtering to produce the final inpainted result EP$
in the encrypted domain. The content owner can
decrypt EP$ to obtain the inpainted image Ir in the
plaintext domain. The flowchart of our scheme is illu-
strated in Figure 2. Details are described in the follow-
ing subsections.
Image encryption
To protect the privacy of content owner, the damaged
image Id to be outsourced for inpainting is first
encrypted as two results through the cryptographic
techniques, that is, Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem
and JL transform. In detail, one encrypted result EP is
obtained by Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem, which
enables the filling or removing for the target region V
with sample patches and the performing of the weighted
Figure 1. Framework of privacy-preserving inpainting for
outsourced image.
Figure 2. Flowchart of the proposed encrypted-image
inpainting scheme.
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mean filtering; the other encrypted result EJ is obtained
by JL transform, which enables the operation of block
matching. In addition, a mask image Q is also gener-
ated and used to label the position of target region V
for inpainting.
Encryption with Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem. The con-
tent owner first encrypts each pixel of the damaged
image Id sized H 3 W in the plaintext domain through
homomorphic cryptosystem and obtains the encrypted
result of each pixel by equation (1)
r(i, j)=f ½m(i, j), kp  ð1Þ
where u denotes the encryption function based on
homomorphic cryptosystem, m(i, j) denotes the value
of the pixel in Id at the coordinate (i, j), kp is the public
key of content owner, and r(i, j) denotes the encrypted
result for the pixel m(i, j). Details of the calculation in
equation (1) are given as follows.
In our scheme, Paillier36 homomorphic encryption
belonging to the RSA-based probabilistic public-key
cryptosystem is utilized. In Paillier homomorphic
encryption, the content owner first chooses two large
primes p and q randomly and calculates n = pq and
l = lcm(p 2 1, q 2 1), where lcm() denotes the func-
tion of the least common multiple. Then, an integer
g2Zn2* is selected, which should satisfy gcd{[(gl mod
n2) 2 1]/n, n} = 1. The function gcd() is used to
return the greatest common divisor. Thus, the public
key kp and the private key ks of content owner can be
acquired
kp = (n, g) ð2Þ
ks = (p, q, l) ð3Þ
After generating the public key and the private key,
the encryption for each pixel in Id can be conducted
with the public key kp, see equation (4)
r(i, j)= gm(i, j)  rn(i, j) mod n2 ð4Þ
where each pixel value for encryption, that is, the plain-
text m(i, j) 2Zn, and r(i, j) 2Zn* that is an n coprime,
random number (blinding factor). It should be noted
that due to the randomness of r(i, j), the pixels with the
same value and different coordinates may have differ-
ent encrypted results. After all H 3 W pixels m(i, j) in
the damaged image Id are encrypted with equation (4),
the content owner collects all corresponding encrypted
pixels r(i, j) to form the encrypted image EP.
Actually, besides Paillier homomorphic encryption,
the encryption method to generate EP in our scheme
can also be compatible and replaced with some other
additive homomorphic cryptosystems effectively. In
addition, the Ring learning with errors (RLWE)-based
SHE cryptosystem may also be utilized to further
improve the computational efficiency.
Encryption with JL transform. To achieve the operation of
block matching in our encrypted-image inpainting, the
JL transform, which can not only reduce dimension
but also retain Euclidean distance,40 is also utilized for
image encryption. The property of JL transform is
based on the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For an arbitrary set V with N vectors belong-
ing to Rd, given 0 \ e \ 1 and k ø log2 N/e
2, there
exists a linear mapping G that can transform each vec-
tor of V from Rd into Rk, and all pairwise distances
after and before mapping are within 1 6 e factor. That
is to say, for any two vectors a and b in V, the follow-
ing relationship of the inequality satisfies
(1 e)  a bk k22




where a, b2Rd, and G(a), G(b)2Rk.
Through JL transform, a d-dimension vector can be
converted to a k-dimension vector, and the Euclidean
distance of two d-dimension vectors is approximate to
that of the corresponding two k-dimension vectors after
the transform. In Kenthapadi et al.,41 they analyzed the
security of JL transform and proved that JL transform
can be utilized for data encryption effectively. In our
scheme, a random matrix < sized k 3 d (<2Rk 3 d),
associated with the secret key kJ, is used as the linear
mapping G in equation (5), that is, G(a) = <a. Note
that, the transform from a to G(a) by < is an irreversi-
ble process when k \ d.
When encrypting the damaged image Id by JL trans-
form, for each pixel m(i, j) in Id, its neighboring s 2 1
pixels are collected to form an s-pixels local pattern
with the pixel m(i, j) at the center. For the pixels on the
image border, incomplete pixels in the local pattern can
be created with surrounding pixels. Reshape the s-pix-
els in the local pattern with the center of m(i, j) into an
s-dimension vector, which is denoted as Ni, j. Then,
according to the secret key kJ of JL transform, a ran-
dom matrix < sized k 3 s and a random k-dimension
Gaussian noise vector s with zero mean are generated
and utilized for encryption
Li, j =<3Ni, j +s ð6Þ
where Li, j is a k-dimension vector and denotes the
encrypted result for the pixel m(i, j). Note that, different
with the Paillier encryption in section ‘‘Encryption with
Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem,’’ the encrypted
result of each pixel by JL transform is a vector instead
of a single value. After all H 3 W pixels m(i, j) in Id
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are encrypted through equation (6), the content owner
collects all corresponding encrypted results Li, j to form
the encrypted image EJ.
Generation of mask image. Similar with the conventional
image inpainting in the plaintext domain, the location
of the image region to be inpainted should be provided
to the restorer, who does not compromise the security
of the scheme. Therefore, a binary mask image Q for
locating the target region V in the damaged image Id
(EP) is produced by the content owner
u(i, j)=
1, (i, j) 2 O ,
0, (i, j) 62 O ,

ð7Þ
where u(i, j) is the value of the pixel at the coordinate
(i, j) in the mask image Q, and Q is also with the size
of H 3 W, which is the same as Id and EP.
After the above operations, including Paillier encryp-
tion, JL transform, and mask generation, the content
owner sends the obtained results EP, EJ, and Q to the
image restorer for inpainting in the encrypted domain.
Inpainting for encrypted image
After receiving the two encrypted images EP, EJ, and
the mask image Q, image restorer conducts patch filling
for image inpainting through the exemplar-based tex-
ture synthesis in the encrypted domain, see Figure 3.
The target region V in EP is first located according to
the positions of non-zeros in Q. To determine the order
of inpainting, for each pixel c in O, a block Bc sized l 3
l with c at the center is exploited to calculate the prior-
ity. Among all pixels in O, the block Bc* with the high-
est priority is chosen as the first for repairing.
A source region F that contains sufficient, intact
pixels is defined for the candidate block searching.
Since JL transform preserves Euclidean distance, thus,
with the assist of EJ, the best-matching block Bs* with
respect to Bc* can be found in F, and then, in the
encrypted image EP, the damaged patch of Bc* can be
filled with the corresponding patch of Bs*. After that,
the values in the mask image Q corresponding to the
pixels in the filled patch are marked as zeros, and the
target region V, the source region F, and the encrypted
image EJ are updated. The block priorities for the
updated O are recalculated, and the above procedure is
iterated until the target region V becomes empty. To
further smooth the inpainted region, the intermediate
result EP# after patch filling is performed with the
weighted mean filtering in encrypted domain based on
Paillier homomorphic properties to produce the final
inpainted result EP$. Details are described as follows.
Block priority calculation. To inpaint the target region V
of the encrypted image EP, the order of inpainting for
all the pixels in V should be first determined, which is
based on the priority of the block with each pixel of V
at the center. Since image restorer does not know the
image contents and pixel values from EP and EJ in our
encrypted-image inpainting scheme, hence, only the
location information of intact and damaged pixels from
Q can be utilized for block priority calculation.
Obviously, the original intact pixels can be used as
references during block matching. Therefore, rather
than inpainting from inner to outer, it is more appro-
priate to perform inpainting for V from the outer
region to the inner region because the blocks on the
boundary of V, that is, ∂O, include some intact pixels.
Thus, the useful information of intact pixels can be
effectively used and propagated into target region V,
which can lead to a more reasonable inpainted result.
Based on the above analysis, in our scheme, two
conditions are considered during the calculation of the
block priority: (1) the center pixels of the blocks with
higher priorities should be on the boundary of V, that
is, ∂O; and (2) the blocks with higher priorities should
have more intact or inpainted pixels. These two condi-
tions can guarantee a best-first filling mechanism dur-
ing inpainting and are biased toward those blocks that
are on the continuous, strong edges and surrounded by
high-confidence pixels. In the target region V of EP,
the block priority Oc corresponding to the block Bc




, c 2 ∂O ,
0, c 62 ∂O ,

ð8Þ
where the function J(Bc) returns the number of intact
pixels in the l 3 l block Bc with the pixel c at the cen-
ter, and the value of the block priority Oc belongs to [0,
Figure 3. Illustration of patch filling by exemplar-based texture
synthesis in encrypted domain.
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1]. Actually, the number of intact pixels in the block Bc
of the encrypted image EP can be counted by the num-
ber of zeros in the corresponding block of the mask
image Q. After the block priorities Oc for all pixels c
on ∂O are obtained, the block Bc* with the highest pri-




It should be noted that, the size l 3 l of the blocks
for priority calculation and further block matching may
have influence on the performance of inpainting. Too
small size of the blocks will weaken texture features in
the inpainted results. However, if the block size is too
large, inpainted results will appear the serious mosaic
effect. In addition, the size r 3 r of the source region
F is related to inpainting quality and computation
complexity. Therefore, the selection of appropriate sizes
of block and source region is important, which is dis-
cussed in section ‘‘Experimental results and analysis.’’
Block matching and patch filling. After obtaining the block
Bc* with the highest priority in current target region O
of EP, the block matching between Bc* and all candi-
date blocks in source region F is conducted with the
assist of EJ, and then the corresponding patch Cs* in
the best-matching candidate block Bs* is utilized to fill
the damaged patch Cc* in Bc*.
The operation of block matching is based on the
property of Euclidean distance preserving for JL trans-
form. To conduct block matching and patch filling, the
distance between the block Bc* and each candidate




D ½EJ(i, j), EJ(i+ x, j+ y)
l2
subject to Bs 2 F ,
ð10Þ
where (x, y) is the coordinate displacement of Bs with
respect to Bc*, s can be considered as the center pixel in
Bs, and the function D for the calculation of the dis-
tance between the two points of k-dimension vectors in
EJ can be found in equation (11)
D ½EJ(i1, j1), EJ(i2, j2)=
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
Li1, j1  Li2, j2
 2
2
2k  sk k22
q
ð11Þ
where Li1, j1 and Li2, j2 denote two points of k-dimen-
sion vectors in EJ, that is, EJ(i1, j1) and EJ(i2, j2), which
are also the two encrypted results based on JL trans-
form for the plaintext pixels m(i1, j1) and m(i2, j2),
respectively (refer to section ‘‘Encryption with JL trans-
form’’). Because the Euclidean distance between two
vectors in JL-encrypted domain is approximate to that
in the plaintext domain, thus, the candidate block Bs
from F with the smallest distance to the block Bc* is
selected as the best-matching block Bs*, where
s= argmin
s
dist(Bc, Bs)½  ð12Þ
Through obtaining the best-matching block Bs* in
the encrypted image EP, the damaged patch Cc* of Bc*
can be filled with the corresponding patch Cs* of Bs*.
In other words, all the encrypted, damaged pixels in Bc*
are replaced by the encrypted, intact pixels at the same




for 8(i, j) 2 Bc and u(i, j)= 1
ð13Þ
where (x*, y*) is the coordinate displacement of Bs*
with respect to Bc*, and EP#(i, j) is the filled result for
the encrypted, damaged pixel EP(i, j). Besides the patch
filling for the block Bc* in EP, the encrypted image EJ
should also be repaired through the similar process
L0i, j =Li+ x, j+ y , for 8(i, j) 2 Bc and u(i, j)= 1
ð14Þ
where L#i, j denotes the filled result for the encrypted,
damaged vector Li, j, that is, EJ(i, j), in EJ. After the
patch filling in EP and EJ, the mask image Q is required
for updating
u 0(i, j)=
1, (i, j) 2 O Bc ,
0, (i, j) 62 O Bc ,

ð15Þ
where u#(i, j) is the updated value of the pixel at the
coordinate (i, j) in the new mask image Q#. Equation
(15) means that the damaged patch in Bc* is repaired
and can be marked as intact. Note that, the target
region V and the source region F should also be
updated at the same time with Q, that is, the new V# is
updated with V 2 Bc* and the new F# is updated with
F + Bc*.
According to the above described steps, the opera-
tions of block priority calculation, block matching, and
patch filling are iteratively implemented for the updated
target region V#. Until the target region becomes
empty, the iteration procedure is terminated and gener-
ates an inpainted result for the encrypted image EP,
that is, EP#.
Region smoothing with weighted mean filtering. Because the
process of patch filling in section ‘‘Block matching and
patch filling’’ is performed in a blockwise manner, thus,
undesirable mosaic effect may appear in the target
region V if the inpainted result EP# is directly
decrypted. To eliminate the mosaic effect, the post-
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processing should be conducted for EP# in the
encrypted domain. Thereby, after image decryption by
content owner or legal receiver, an inpainted image in
the plaintext domain with satisfactory quality can be
produced.
In our scheme, after patch filling, image restorer con-
ducts region smoothing for the target region V in the
intermediate result EP# to achieve the equivalent func-
tion of weighted mean filtering in the plaintext domain.
The operation of region smoothing in the encrypted
domain is realized based on homomorphic properties of
Paillier cryptosystem. The utilized homomorphic prop-
erties of addition are described as follows.
Assume m(i1, j1) and m(i2, j2) as the values of two
pixels at the coordinates (i1, j1) and (i2, j2) in plaintext
domain, respectively. Denote r(i1, j1) and r(i2, j2) as the
encrypted results of m(i1, j1) and m(i2, j2) based on
Paillier homomorphic encryption (refer to section
‘‘Encryption with Paillier homomorphic cryptosys-
tem’’), see equation (16)
r(in, jn)= g
m(in , jn)  rn(in, jn) mod n2, n = 1, 2 ð16Þ
Then, the following three equations (17)–(19) can be
acquired, where k is an integer
r(i1, j1)  gk mod n2 = gm(i1, j1)  rn(i1, j1)  gk mod n2
= gm(i1, j1)+ k  rn(i1, j1) mod n2
ð17Þ
r(i1, j1)  r(i2, j2) mod n2
= gm(i1, j1)  rn(i1, j1)  gm(i2, j2)  rn(i2, j2) mod n2
= gm(i1, j1)+m(i2, j2)½r(i1, j1) r(i2, j2)n mod n2
ð18Þ
rk(i1, j1) mod n
2 = ½gm(i1, j1)  rn(i1, j1)k mod n2
= gkm(i1, j1)rkn(i1, j1) mod n
2
ð19Þ
It can be observed from equations (17)–(19) that,
under Paillier cryptosystem, r(i1, j1)gk mod n2 is a valid
encrypted result for m(i1, j1) + k, r(i1, j1) r(i2, j2)
mod n2 is a valid encrypted result for m(i1, j1) + m(i2,
j2), and r
k(i1, j1) mod n
2 is a valid encrypted result for
km(i1, j1), respectively.
As for the weighted mean filtering in the plaintext
domain, the current pixel m(i, j) in target region V for
processing should be substituted with the weighted
mean value of m(i, j) itself and its neighboring pixels
m0(i, j)=Wi, j MTi, j
= ½wi1, j, wi+ 1, j, wi, j, wi, j1, wi, j+ 1 
½m(i 1, j), m(i+ 1, j), m(i, j), m(i, j1), m(i, j+ 1)T
=wi1, j  m(i1, j)+wi+1, j  m(i+1, j)+wi, j  m(i, j)+
wi, j1  m(i, j 1)+wi, j+ 1  m(i, j+ 1) ,
ð20Þ
where Mi, j denotes the pixel vector consisting of cur-
rent pixel m(i, j) and its four neighborhood, Wi, j is the
weight vector for Mi, j, and m#(i, j) is the result of
weighted mean filtering for m(i, j). In our scheme, the
components of the weight vector Wi, j can be set as: wi
2 1,j = wi + 1,j = wi, j 2 1 = wi, j + 1 = 1/(4 + v)
and wi, j = v/(4 + v), where v is a small positive
integer. To realize weighted mean filtering in encrypted
domain based on Paillier homomorphic properties of
equations (17) and (19), the components of the weight
vector Wi, j should be modified as integers
W0i, j =(4+v) Wi, j ð21Þ
where W#i, j = [w#i 2 1,j, w#i + 1,j, w#i, j, w#i, j 2 1, w#i, j
+ 1] = [1, 1, v, 1, 1]. Thus, for the intermediate result
EP# after patch filling, according to the homomorphic
properties of addition in equations (17)–(19), image
restorer can perform the following operation to realize
weighted mean filtering in the encrypted domain
r00(i, j)= r0(i 1, j)w0i1, j  r0(i+ 1, j)w0i+ 1, j 
r0(i, j)w
0
i, j  r0(i, j 1)w0i, j1  r0(i, j+ 1)w0i, j+ 1
= r0(i 1, j)  r0(i+ 1, j)  r0(i, j)v
r0(i, j 1)  r0(i, j+ 1),
for 8(i, j) 2 O ,
ð22Þ
where r#(i, j) denotes the value of the encrypted pixel at
coordinate (i, j) in EP#, and r$(i, j) is the result of
weighted mean filtering for r#(i, j) in Paillier-encrypted
domain.
After all pixels r#(i, j) in EP# belonging to the original
target region V finish the above processing in equation (22)
as r$(i, j), the final inpainted, encrypted image EP$ with
patch filling and region smoothing can be obtained, which
can be then transmitted to the content owner or authorized
receiver for decryption, and the privacy-preserving inpaint-
ing for the outsourced image is completed.
Image decryption
After receiving the final inpainted, encrypted image EP$
from image restorer, the content owner or the authorized
receiver conducts image decryption through the private
key ks = (p, q, l) of Paillier encryption in equation (3)
m0(i, j)=
½r00(i, j)l mod n2  1
½gl mod n2  1 mod n ,
for 8(i, j) 2 EP00
ð23Þ
where m#(i, j) denotes the decrypted result of r$(i, j)
based on Paillier36 cryptosystem. Then, since the weight
vector W#i, j is multiplied by (4 + v) during the
weighted mean filtering (refer to section ‘‘Region
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smoothing with weighted mean filtering’’), hence, all
decrypted results m#(i, j) should be further processed to




, for 8(i, j) 2 O ,
m0(i, j) , for 8(i, j) 62 O ,
(
ð24Þ
where m$(i, j) denotes the value of the pixel at coordi-
nate (i, j) of the final inpainted image Ir in the plaintext
domain.
Experimental results and analysis
To demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of the
proposed scheme, a large number of test images were
applied to conduct privacy-preserving image inpainting
in the encrypted domain. In addition, we also compared
the performance of inpainted quality between our
scheme and some typical image inpainting schemes in
the plaintext domain. Note that, in real applications, we
often do not have original intact images. In the experi-
ments, original intact images were just used to generate
corresponding damaged images and to evaluate the
visual quality of inpainted results as the references.
Some of the images used in experiments and analysis,
including Lena, Baboon Portofino, Zelda, Lake, House,
Peppers, and Elaine, are illustrated in Figure 4.
Examples of the proposed scheme
In the proposed scheme, the inpainting operation is per-
formed on the encrypted, damaged image EP of Paillier
homomorphic encryption. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the
encrypted results for the two standard test images Lena
and Baboon both with the sizes of 512 3 512, in which
subfigures (a) and (b) are the original images and their
corresponding mask images Q for locating the damaged
areas (target regions V were marked as black), and sub-
figures (c) and (d) are the damaged images in the plain-
text domain and the Paillier-encrypted domain,
respectively. The damaged rates t, which are defined as
the ratios between the numbers of black pixels and all
pixels in the mask images Q, for Lena and Baboon are
4.93% and 5.20%, respectively. Note that, pixel values
of the encrypted images in Figures 5 and 6(d) are the
results after modulo 256 for displaying. It can be clearly
observed from Figures 5 and 6 that, the contents of
original images are concealed after encryption, which
can protect the privacy of the content owner effectively.
After image encryption, the encrypted, damaged
images were outsourced to image restorer for inpaint-
ing in the encrypted domain through the method
described in section ‘‘Inpainting for encrypted image’’
(including patch filling and region smoothing). Then,
the inpainted results in encrypted domain were sent
back to the content owner or authorized receiver.
Finally, after image decryption, the inpainted images in
the plaintext domain were acquired. Figures 7 and 8(a)
show the inpainted images in the encrypted domain for
the two encrypted, damaged images Lena and Baboon
in Figures 5 and 6(d), respectively, and their corre-
sponding inpainted results in the plaintext domain (i.e.
after image decryption) are presented in Figures 7 and
8(b). In our experiments, the two typical indices, peak
Figure 4. Some of the test images. (a) Lena. (b) Baboon. (c) Portofino. (d) Zelda. (e) Lake. (f) House. (g) Peppers. (h) Elaine.
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signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) and structural similarity
(SSIM),42 were utilized to evaluate visual quality of
inpainted images in plaintext domain. Obviously, the
greater the values of PSNR and SSIM are, the better
visual quality of the inpainted image Ir with respect to
the original intact image Io is. PSNR values of the
inpainted images Lena and Baboon in Figures 7 and
8(b) were calculated as 44.65 and 42.56 dB, and their
SSIM values were 0.9826 and 0.9615, respectively. It
can be found from Figures 7 and 8(b) and the values of
PSNR and SSIM that, the visual quality of inpainted
results for our scheme is satisfactory.
Parameter analysis
In our encrypted-image inpainting scheme, there are
four main parameters: s and k in JL transform (section
‘‘Encryption with JL transform’’), the size l 3 l of the
block for priority calculation and matching (section
‘‘Block priority calculation’’), and the size r 3 r of
source region for conducting block matching (section
‘‘Block matching and patch filling’’). The influence of
inpainting performance with respect to these para-
meters is analyzed detailedly in the following. The
experiments for parameter analysis in this subsection
were conducted on the standard images sized
512 3 512. Besides Lena (t = 4.93%) and Baboon
(t = 5.20%) in Figures 5 and 6(c), the other two stan-
dard images Portofino and Zelda were also used and
their damaged rates t are 3.98% and 3.95% with ran-
dom forms, respectively.
Figure 5. Encrypted results based on Paillier homomorphic encryption for Lena. (a) Original image. (b) Mask image Q. (c) Damaged
image Id (t = 4.93%). (d) Encrypted, damaged image EP.
Figure 6. Encrypted results based on Paillier homomorphic encryption for Baboon. (a) Original image. (b) Mask image Q. (c)
Damaged image Id (t = 5.20%). (d) Encrypted, damaged image EP.
Figure 7. Inpainted results for Lena. (a) Inpainted image EP$ in
encrypted domain. (b) Inpainted image Ir after decryption
(PSNR = 44.65 dB, SSIM = 0.9826).
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Parameters s and k in JL transform. During the image
encryption of JL transform, a random matrix < sized k
3 s is utilized, see equation (6), which can securely
transform a s-pixels local pattern into a k-dimension
vector for each center pixel m(i, j) and also retain the
Euclidean distance. Based on a large number of experi-
ments, we find that, the parameter s has obvious influ-
ence on the visual quality of inpainted results because
the distance for block matching is significantly changed
with different values of s, while the influence of para-
meter k is not obvious. In Table 1, with the values of s
equaling to 5, 9, and 25, the indices of PSNR and SSIM
for the inpainted images, including Lena, Baboon,
Portofino, and Zelda, are given, and the three local pat-
terns in Figure 9(a)–(c) correspond to s = 5, s = 9,
and s = 25, respectively. It can be concluded from the
results that, generally speaking, the smaller the value of
s is, the better quality of inpainted results can be
obtained. In the process of image encryption with JL
transform, each ciphertext is determined by all the s-
pixels in the local pattern, thus, smaller patterns can
reflect local information of plaintext pixels more accu-
rately. In addition, we can observe from the results that,
for most images, the visual quality of inpainted results
were satisfactory when s was set as 5. However, when s
was set as a larger value, such as 9 or 25, the Euclidean
distance between two JL-encrypted pixels covered more
unnecessary information of adjacent pixels, which led
to inaccurate results in searching the best-matching
block, and degraded the inpainted quality.
Parameter of size l 3 l for block priority calculation and block
matching. The procedure of encrypted-image inpainting
described in sections ‘‘Block priority calculation’’ and
‘‘Block matching and patch filling’’ is performed in the
blockwise manner. For each pixel c in the target region
O, a block Bc sized l 3 l with c at the center is
exploited for priority calculation and block matching.
Therefore, the block size l 3 l is also a key factor that
Table 1. Visual quality of inpainted results under different s and k of JL transform (l = 11, r = 33).
Parameters Lena Baboon Portofino Zelda
s k PSNR SSIM PSNR SSIM PSNR SSIM PSNR SSIM
25 9 43.36 0.9775 40.70 0.9495 43.42 0.9784 42.79 0.9755
25 7 43.51 0.9778 40.51 0.9522 43.43 0.9780 42.95 0.9746
25 5 43.39 0.9781 40.48 0.9483 43.34 0.9779 42.92 0.9750
25 3 43.39 0.9789 40.47 0.9469 43.40 0.9783 42.49 0.9750
25 1 43.31 0.9799 40.55 0.9511 43.34 0.9773 42.89 0.9744
9 9 44.09 0.9819 41.06 0.9527 45.40 0.9825 44.22 0.9764
9 7 44.12 0.9816 41.32 0.9479 45.74 0.9830 44.23 0.9764
9 5 44.10 0.9813 41.06 0.9509 45.53 0.9826 44.04 0.9736
9 3 44.26 0.9814 41.08 0.9492 45.73 0.9833 43.98 0.9745
9 1 44.23 0.9814 41.27 0.9553 45.65 0.9823 44.17 0.9751
5 9 44.51 0.9831 41.65 0.9616 45.49 0.9841 44.54 0.9778
5 7 44.65 0.9826 41.64 0.9589 45.45 0.9840 44.40 0.9803
5 5 44.57 0.9831 41.70 0.9615 45.70 0.9837 44.37 0.9769
5 3 44.46 0.9831 41.62 0.9665 45.74 0.9841 44.09 0.9788
5 1 44.55 0.9828 41.42 0.9641 45.78 0.9837 44.04 0.9774
PSNR: peak signal-to-noise ratio; SSIM: structural similarity.
Figure 8. Inpainted results for Baboon. (a) Inpainted image EP$
in encrypted domain. (b) Inpainted image Ir after decryption
(PSNR = 42.56 dB, SSIM = 0.9615).
Figure 9. Three local patterns used in image encryption based
on JL transform. (a) s = 5. (b) s = 9. (c) s = 25.
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has influence on the inpainting performance.
Detailedly, too smaller size of block Bc may cause the
loss of texture features in the inpainted result, while too
larger size leads to the serious mosaic effect probably.
It can be observed from Figure 10 that, for most
images sized 512 3 512, the visual quality of inpainted
results decreases rapidly when l is smaller than 11, the
inpainted quality has a downward trend when l is
greater than 17, and the inpainted quality tends to
be relatively stable when l is in the range between 11
and 17.
Parameter of size r 3 r for source region F. In our
scheme, the source region F for searching the best-
matching block can be defined as the entire image
excluding the target region V. However, for the trade-
off of acceptable inpainted quality and feasible compu-
tation complexity, rather than the entire image, we only
set a dilated window centered at the current pixel c and
sized r 3 r as the source region F. The correlation
between the block Bc* and all candidate blocks in
source region F for matching is inversely proportional
to their distances; hence, too larger size of source
region F cannot guarantee the satisfactory repaired
results and may make the inpainted region significantly
different with its close neighborhood. However, too
smaller size of source region F may lead to the failure
of finding the appropriate matching block and also
make repaired results unsatisfactory. Therefore, a suit-
able size of source region F should be chosen for
searching the best-matching block. However, from the
results in Figure 11, we can find that the most appro-
priate sizes of source region F leading to the best
inpainted quality fluctuate irregularly in a wide range
for different images. Therefore, the size of source
region F is better to be manually chosen through trial
and error.
Comparisons with plaintext-domain inpainting
schemes
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our scheme, we
compared the decrypted, inpainted results of our pro-
posed ciphertext-domain inpainting scheme with those
of the three famous plaintext-domain inpainting
schemes, that is, TV-based scheme by Shen and Chan,17
Navier–Stokes PDE-based scheme by Bertalmio et al.,2
and exemplar-based scheme by Criminisi et al.20
Figure 12 shows the inpainted results for Lena,
Baboon, Lake, and House, in which the first column to
the fifth column denote the damaged images, the results
of the proposed scheme after image decryption, scheme
by Shen and Chan,17 scheme by Bertalmio et al.,2 and
scheme by Criminisi et al.,20 respectively. The damaged
images Lena in Figure 12(a1) and Baboon in Figure
12(a2) are the same as those in Figures 5(c) and 6(c)
with damaged rates t = 4.93% and t = 5.20%,
respectively. Besides the conventional damage forms
(such as lines and scratches in Lena and Baboon) for
inpainting that can be considered as region filling, the
other two typical examples of object removal for dam-
aged images are presented in Figure 12(a3) and (a4).
Detailedly, Figure 12(a3) shows the damaged image
Lake imposed with a number of texts (t = 4.86%).
Figure 12(a4) shows the image House with a man as an
undesirable foreground object, and to seamlessly
remove the man from the image, this object was
marked as the black region (t = 0.96%). Note that,
inpainting procedure of the schemes2,17,20 was just per-
formed on the plaintext-domain, damaged images in
Figure 10. Visual quality of inpainted results under different sizes l 3 l of block Bc (s = 5, k = 5, r = 33). (a) PSNR of inpainted
results. (b) SSIM of inpainted results.
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Figure 11. Visual quality of inpainted results under different sizes r 3 r for source region F (s = 5, k = 5, l = 11). (a) PSNR of
inpainted results. (b) SSIM of inpainted results.
Figure 12. Comparison results for our encrypted-image inpainting and plaintext-image inpainting.2,17,20 (a1)–(a4) Damaged images
Lena, Baboon, Lake and House. (b1)–(b4) Results of our scheme after decryption. (c1)–(c4) Results of total variation-based scheme.17
(d1)–(d4) Results of Navier–Stokes PDE-based scheme.2 (e1)–(e4) Results of exemplar-based scheme.20
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Figure 12(a1)–(a4), while the inpainting procedure of
the proposed scheme was performed on their Paillier-
encrypted, damaged versions.
We can observe from Figure 12 that the structural
and textural information in the target region, such as
lines and edges in Lena and fur and whiskers in Baboon,
are successfully repaired by our scheme and there are
not obvious blurring effects. Compared with the three
plaintext-domain schemes,2,17,20 our scheme can gener-
ally obtain better visual quality of inpainted results than
the PDE-based schemes2,17 and achieve the comparable
performance with the texture synthesis-based scheme.20
It can also be found that our scheme can seamlessly
remove the imposed texts for Lake and effectively
inpaint the occluded window, bushes, and lawn for
House without a priori model. The values of PSNR and
SSIM for the inpainted results for Lena, Baboon, and
Lake under the four schemes are listed in the first three
rows of Table 2 (PSNR and SSIM for House are not
available due to the absence of original reference
image).
In addition to the above inpainting results in Figure
12 for the four images (Lena, Baboon, Lake, and
House), four other standard test images, including
Portofino, Zelda, Peppers, and Elaine, were also
involved in the experiments. The damaged forms for
these four images were random, and the corresponding
damaged rates t were 3.98%, 3.95%, 3.01%, and
4.19%, respectively. Table 2 gives a summary of PSNR
and SSIM for the seven inpainted images with respect
to their corresponding original images under the three
plaintext-domain inpainting schemes2,17,20 and the pro-
posed ciphertext-domain inpainting scheme. It can be
found that our scheme is more suitable for repairing
the images with richer textures and larger damaged
area. In a word, although the inpainting procedure of
our scheme is implemented in ciphertext domain, it can
achieve comparable inpainting performance with
plaintext-domain schemes and can also realize privacy
preserving for the content owner effectively.
Applications in color images and comparison with
PatchMatch
Besides gray-level images, we also applied our scheme
in color images for privacy-preserving inpainting. Test
images were randomly selected from the ImageNet
database, which is a famous large-scale image database
in the fields of image recognition and computer vision,
and a representative inpainting scheme for color images
in plaintext domain, called PatchMatch,21 was utilized
for comparison, see Figure 13. The first column of
Figure 13 denotes the original images randomly chosen
from ImageNet, and the second column is their dam-
aged versions with various damaged rates. The third
column and the fourth column are the inpainted results
of our scheme (after image decryption) and
PatchMatch,21 respectively. Note that, PatchMatch21
was just performed on the damaged images in plaintext
domain, that is, Figure 13(b1)–(b4), while our scheme
was performed on the Paillier-encrypted, damaged ver-
sions of Figure 13(b1)–(b4). It can be observed from
Figure 13 that the structural and textural information
in the target region, such as lines and textures, was
basically repaired by our scheme, and there were not
obvious blurring effects. Therefore, our scheme can not
only achieve comparable visual quality of inpainted
results with the plaintext-domain scheme for color
images, that is, PatchMatch,21 but also can realize pri-
vacy protection for image contents from content owner
since our inpainting operation of image restorer is pro-
cessed on encrypted versions of damaged images.
Discussions of security and computational complexity
Security discussions. Since Paillier36 proved that Paillier
encryption provides semantic security and the attacker
cannot learn any information of the plaintext except
for the length of the plaintext, hence, we mainly discuss
the security of JL transform used in the scheme. In our
scheme, the encrypted result of each pixel by JL
Table 2. Comparisons of {PSNR, SSIM} for the inpainted results between the proposed scheme and the schemes in Shen and











Lena 4.93 {34.25, 0.9831} {43.17, 0.9811} {44.99, 0.9805} {44.65, 0.9826}
Baboon 5.20 {32.32, 0.9706} {39.45, 0.9555} {42.20, 0.9676} {42.56, 0.9615}
Lake 4.86 {30.79, 0.9779} {45.83, 0.9877} {43.41, 0.9752} {43.58, 0.9822}
Portofino 3.98 {37.98, 0.9873} {42.10, 0.9771} {45.57, 0.9780} {46.06, 0.9832}
Zelda 3.95 {38.49, 0.9878} {43.14, 0.9841} {44.52, 0.9841} {44.54, 0.9778}
Peppers 3.01 {39.77, 0.9943} {43.04, 0.9850} {47.52, 0.9884} {46.74, 0.9864}
Elaine 4.19 {38.28, 0.9896} {39.87, 0.9701} {44.10, 0.9822} {45.63, 0.9711}
Average 4.30 {35.98, 0.9844} {42.37, 0.9772} {44.61, 0.9794} {44.82, 0.9778}
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transform is a vector instead of a single value. After all
H 3 W pixels m(i, j) in Id are encrypted through equa-
tion (6), the content owner collects all corresponding
encrypted results Li, j to form the encrypted image EJ.
Binarization attack mentioned in Hu et al.29 means that
for each JL-encrypted result Li, j with respect to the
plaintext pixel m(i, j), which is a k-dimension vector,
calculate the mean value of the k components in Li, j,
thus, corresponding to H 3 W plaintext pixels,
H 3 W mean values can be obtained, which preserve
the relative positions and intensities of pixels in the
plaintext image Id. Then, the attacker can easily
quantize these H 3 W mean values into binary values
through setting a threshold and reshape these H 3 W
binary values to produce a binary image sized H 3 W,
which is visually approximate to Id and leaks the pri-
vacy of image owner.
To defeat the potential binarization attack, we
should eliminate the correlation between neighboring
pixels. Hence, after Paillier encryption and JL trans-
form, random permutation should be further per-
formed on the two encrypted images EP, EJ, and their
corresponding mask image Q. It should be noted that
our inpainting scheme is based on patch filling, and
Figure 13. Inpainting application for color images and comparison between our encrypted-image inpainting with the plaintext-
image PatchMatch inpainting.21 (a1)–(a4) Original images from ImageNet. (b1)–(b4) Damaged versions of (a1)–(a4). (c1)–(c4) Results
of our scheme after decryption. (d1)–(d4) Results of PatchMatch.21
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damaged region is repaired patch by patch rather than
pixel by pixel. Hence, in our scheme, the random per-
mutation is conducted on EP, EJ, and Q in a blockwise
manner. In addition, to keep the corresponding rela-
tionships for the encrypted results of EP, EJ, and Q, the
same pseudo-random permutation sequence derived by
secret key kr should be utilized for them. Thus, without
knowing the secret key kr, the attacker may try all pos-
sible permutations and the number of all possible per-
mutations is (H 3 W / l2)! For an image sized
512 3 512 (H = W = 512) and the block size equal-
ing 9 3 9 (l = 9), the possibility for the attacker to
crack the correct permutation is lower than 1/3236!
Therefore, without the secret key kr, even if the
attacker implements the binarization attack on the
ciphertext encrypted by JL transform, it is difficult to
recover approximate content of original image Id
because the locations of image blocks are completely
permuted.
However, since local correlation in the permuted
image is removed after random permutation, the source
region F sized r 3 r for candidate block searching will
no longer work. An effective way to solve this problem
is directly extending the source region F sized r 3 r to
the whole image sized H 3 W. In other words, block
matching will be conducted within the whole image
instead of the source region, which may increase com-
putational complexity significantly. Hence, we can
adopt the random sampling strategy in Chan et al.43 to
reduce computational complexity, which only ran-
domly calculates a small number of image block dis-
tances according to sampling patterns.
Computational complexity. In our scheme, both JL
Transform and Paillier encryption cause the ciphertext
expansion. To reduce the storage on the client side, the
image pixels can be encrypted one by one, and each
encrypted pixel is directly transmitted to the cloud
immediately. Thus, the client side does not need to
store the whole encrypted images. As for Paillier
encryption indicated in equation (4), the total data vol-
ume transmitted from the client side to the cloud is
about 2| n| 3 H 3 W bits, where| n| denotes the bit
length of n, and H 3 W is the number of image pixels.
Thus, for a 1024-bit integer n, the ciphertext expansion
ratio of Paillier encryption in our scheme is about
2 3 1024 / 8 = 256 for one 8-bit pixel. Since the
encrypted result of each pixel m(i, j) for JL transform is
a k-dimension vector instead of a single value, hence,
the ciphertext expansion ratio of JL transform is
approximately equal to the parameter k in our scheme.
After the cloud completes the operation of image
inpainting in encrypted domain, the final inpainted,
Paillier-encrypted image EP$ should be transmitted
from the cloud to the client for decryption, while the
ciphertext EJ encrypted by JL transform does not need
to be sent back to the client.
As for execution time, the most complicated computa-
tion on the client side is Paillier encryption and decryp-
tion. To increase the efficiency, we adopted the fast
algorithm proposed by Jost et al.,44 which is a variant of
Paillier cryptosystem based on pre-computing and look-
up table. The execution time for the different operations
on the sender side and the receiver side is listed in Table
3, which includes Paillier encryption, JL transform, ran-
dom permutation for image owner/sender, and Paillier
decryption and inverse permutation for legal receiver.
The pre-computing before encryption consumes 9.56 s.
Note that, JL transform is only required on the sender
side, and random permutation is conducted for EP, EJ,
and Q on the sender side and only for EP$ on the recei-
ver side. All experiments were implemented on a personal
computer with a 3.20 GHz Intel i5 processor, 4 GB
memory, and Windows 7 operating system.
Conclusion
In this work, we propose a new privacy-preserving
inpainting framework for outsource image and a spe-
cific encrypted-image inpainting scheme, which can not
only repair scratches and remove undesirable objects in
images seamlessly but also can protect the user privacy
through encrypting image contents toward image
restorer. Paillier encryption and JL transform are both
applied by content owner to generate encrypted results
for the damaged image. The inpainting mechanism of
our scheme is based on block matching and patch
Table 3. Execution time of different operations (seconds).
Image owner/sender Image size Paillier encryption JL transform Random permutation
256 3 256 1.936 0.185 1.172
512 3 512 7.752 0.743 4.604
Image owner/receiver Image size Inverse permutation Paillier decryption
256 3 256 0.483 6.325
512 3 512 1.956 25.169
JL: Johnson–Lindenstrauss.
16 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
filling for the marked target region according to prior-
ity order. Since JL transform can preserve Euclidean
distance between two vectors before and after encryp-
tion, the best-matching block with the smallest distance
to current block can be found in source region and uti-
lized for patch filling in the Paillier-encrypted image by
image restorer. To further eliminate the possible mosaic
effect after decryption, weighted mean filtering for the
intermediate, inpainted image in encrypted domain is
conducted based on homomorphic properties of addi-
tion in Paillier cryptosystem. After image decryption
with correct secret key, content owner or authorized
receiver can obtain the final inpainted image in plain-
text domain. Experimental results demonstrate that the
proposed encrypted-image inpainting scheme not only
achieves comparable performance of inpainted-image
quality with those typical inpainting schemes for plain-
text images but also realizes privacy preserving for
image content owner effectively due to the complete
encrypted-domain operation.
Our current work belongs to non-learning-based
inpainting method with privacy-preserving capability.
However, learning-based methods can achieve superior
global semantic structures of inpainted results, especially
with rapid development of deep learning technique.
Therefore, in the future, how to effectively and effi-
ciently achieve the learning-based, privacy-preserving
image inpainting deserves in-depth investigations. Some
works studied privacy-preserving deep learning with
homomorphic cryptosystem45,46 and utilized asynchro-
nous stochastic gradient descent as applied to neural net-
works, combining with the additively homomorphic
encryption, which are helpful to our future work. In
addition, functional encryption supports the restricted
secret keys that enable a key holder to learn a specific
function of encrypted data, but learn nothing else about
the data,47 which may be suitable well to solve the prob-
lem of block matching (i.e. a specific function) in
encrypted domain. Hence, further works also include
realizing encrypted block matching through functional
encryption and achieving the noise-resisting robustness
of privacy-preserving inpainting.
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